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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON
and JOAN ELISSA McPHERSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
No. 910108
vs.
VAUGHN BELNAP and
JEFFREY BELNAP
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
VAUGHN BELNAP
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This is an appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.

The

Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j),
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
For purposes of clarity, and to avoid confusion,
appellant Vaughn Belnap will be referred to as "Vaughn".
Jeffrey Belnap will be identified as "Jeffrey".

defendantCodefendant

Plaintiffs-appellees Joseph

and Joan McPherson will be referred to as "McPherson".
1.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Vaughn

entered into a contract of bailment with McPherson, that Vaughn and
1

McPherson stood in the relationship of bailee and bailor and that
McPherson's personal property was delivered to Vaughn rather than
Jeffrey.
2.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a bailment was

created, whether the trial court erred in concluding that it was a bailment for mutual benefit, as opposed to a gratuitous bailment and that,
consequently, a standard of simple negligence, as opposed to gross
negligence, was applicable.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in imposing a presumption of

negligence on Vaughn.
4.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Vaughn was

negligent and that his negligence proximately caused McPherson's injuries.
5.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Vaughn did

not rebut the presumption, if any, that he was negligent and that his
negligence caused the loss of McPherson's personal property.
These combined issues of law and fact each require the review
of a finding of fact.

The standard of appellate review requires that

Vaughn marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's findings
and demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are
so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence,
thus making them clearly erroneous.
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)).

2

(Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules
or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the issues on
appeal in this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
McPherson brought suit in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County against Vaughn and Jeffrey to recover damages
allegedly arising from the conversion of certain items of personal
property or, in the alternative, arising from a breach of a contract of
bailment.

(Complaint, Record on Appeal, p. 2-6).

Vaughn was served with a Summons and a copy of the Complaint.
(R. 8-10).

Jeffrey was not served with a Summons and the case

proceeded solely against Vaughn.
Vaughn filed his Answer on June 13, 1989 (R. 11-15) and his
Amended Answer on May 30, 1990. (R. 42-47).
The case was tried to the Court, without a jury, the Honorable
John A. Rokich, presiding, on August 30, 1990.
After hearing testimony and the arguments and representations of
counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement.

(R. 84).

On September 14, 1990, the Court rendered its Memorandum
Decision in which it found that McPherson entered into a contract of
bailment with Vaughn, pursuant to which Vaughn stored certain items
of personal property belonging to McPherson, the personal property was
3

stolen, a presumption arose to the effect that Vaughn was negligent,
Vaughn "failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not as a
result of his negligence" and McPherson was damaged in the amount
of $6,000.

(R. 99-102).

McPherson submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

Vaughn filed his Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law. (R. 141-144).
Vaughn then filed a Motion for New Trial and/or to Direct Entry
of Judgment in Favor of Defendant.

(R. 150-151).

On January 2, 1991, the Court rendered its Memorandum Decision
denying the Motion for New Trial.

On January 24, 1991, the Court

entered its Order denying the Motion for New Trial and the Objections
to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 199-200).

On January 24, 1991, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 201-206).
28, 1991.

Judgment was entered on January

(R. 207-209).

Vaughn's Notice of Appeal was filed on February 25, 1991.

(R.

210-211).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Vaughn leased a condominium unit to McPherson during the
month of September, 1988.
In late

November,

(Trial Transcript, p. 37, Ins. 4-7).
1988, Vaughn

requested

that

McPherson

voluntarily vacate the condominium unit because Jeffrey had offered to
buy the unit from Vaughn and because Jeffrey was "going through a
4

divorce" and it would be convenient for him to move into the condominium.

(Trial Transcript, p. 38, Ins. 6-17; p. 7, Ins. 24-25; p. 8 Ins.

1-11).
McPherson agreed to vacate the condominium unit.

(Trial Trans-

cript, p. 8, Ins. 12-25; p. 9, Ins. 1-8; p. 38, Ins. 21-25; p. 39, Ins. 1-9).
McPherson found alternative lodging in a furnished apartment and
informed Vaughn that he had no room to store his furniture.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 9, Ins. 22-25; p. 10, Ins. 1-4).
Vaughn told McPherson that Jeffrey had no furniture because he
was in the process of obtaining a divorce (Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins.
12-16) and that he would speak with Jeffrey concerning McPherson's
proposal to leave the furniture in the condominium unit.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 62, Ins. 8-22).
Jeffrey agreed to keep the furniture in the condominium unit
which he would occupy.

(Trial Transcript, p. 63, Ins. 5-6).

Vaughn then informed McPherson that Jeffrey had agreed to let
him leave some of the furniture in the condominium unit (Trial Transcript, p. 63, Ins. 9-11).
McPherson advised Vaughn of his concerns about the safety of his
property while it was in the condominium unit.
would probably be fine.

Vaughn stated that it

(Trial Transcript, p. 73, Ins. 10-16).

After McPherson vacated the condominium unit, Jeffrey immediately occupied the condominium unit as a tenant, paying rent to Vaughn

5

in the same amount as was paid by McPherson.

(Trial Transcript, p.

64, Ins. 5-17).
Vaughn did not, at any time, have the possession, or use, of
McPherson's furniture.

(Trial Transcript, p. 64, Ins. 18-23).

McPherson acknowledged that the furniture was left in the condominium for Jeffrey's use.

(Trial Transcript, p. 35, Ins. 12-18).

The furniture and other items of personal property owned by
McPherson and left in the condominium unit rented by Jeffrey were
stolen on December 15, 1988.

(Trial Transcript, p. 46, Ins. 2-5; p. 47,

Ins. 1-3; p. 49, Ins. 10-17).
On December 15, 1988, a neighbor saw a pickup truck occupied
by two men loaded with furniture parked in front of the condominium
unit occupied by Jeffrey.
of the truck.

Neither Vaughn nor Jeffrey were occupants

(Trial Transcript, p. 55, Ins. 11-25; p. 56, Ins. 1-4).

The police officer investigating the crime found no evidence of
forcible entry.

The theft was reported at 11:30 p.m.

(Trial Transcr-

ipt, p. 47, Ins. 15-17).
Vaughn lived in the condominium unit prior to the time it was
occupied by McPherson.

At the time Vaughn lived in the unit the

doors were equipped with dead bolt locks and normal security was
provided.

There was no difference in the security of the condominium

unit at the time it was occupied by Vaughn and the time of the theft.
(Trial Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 21-25; p. 69, Ins. 1-8).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

An essential element of the existence of a bailment, and

therefore the creation of the relationship of bailor and bailee, is that
the bailee have actual possession and control of the bailed property.
Although the trial court found that McPherson's property was placed in
the possession and control of Vaughn, there is no evidence to support
this finding.

In fact, the undisputed evidence is that McPherson's

furniture was stored in the condominium unit rented and occupied by
Jeffrey, that Jeffrey had the use of the furniture and that McPherson
intended that Jeffrey have the use of the furniture.

Thus, an essential

element of a bailee-bailor relationship is absent and the erred in
finding that such a relationship existed between Vaughn and McPherson
In addition, the only evidence with respect to the existence of an
agreement between Vaughn and McPherson concerning the storage of
the furniture

is that

Vaughn acted

as an intermediary

between

McPherson and Jeffrey, rather than as a party to the agreement. Thus,
the finding of the trial court is against the clear weight of the evidence.
2. The Court erred in finding that a bailment for mutual benefit,
as opposed to a gratuitous bailment, was created and consequently it
erroneously applied a standard of ordinary care, rather than gross
negligence.

In the context of a bailment for mutual benefit, the bailee

must exercise ordinary care.

A gratuitous bailee is liable only for acts

of gross negligence. Although McPherson argued that Vaughn used the
7

furniture to further the sale of the condominium, the only evidence
before the Court established that Jeffrey

offered

to purchase the

condominium prior to any negotiations concerning furniture storage. As
Jeffrey, not Vaughn, had the use and benefit of the furniture, Vaughn
did not receive a benefit from the alleged bailment.

Therefore, the

bailment, if any, was gratuitous and Vaughn may be held liable only for
acts of gross negligence.
3.

McPherson did not present any evidence, or even identify, any

acts of specific negligence on the part of Vaughn.

In essence,

McPherson prevailed at the trial court because the court imposed a
presumption of negligence. A presumption of negligence in the context
of a bailment may be imposed only where the bailee has exclusive
possession of the bailed goods and exclusive control of the premises in
which the goods are stored.

There is no evidence that Vaughn had

either exclusive possession of the bailed goods or exclusive control of
the condominium unit in which McPherson's furniture was stored.

In

fact, the undisputed evidence establishes that Vaughn did not have
exclusive possession of McPherson's furniture or exclusive control of the
condominium unit.

Therefore, the Court erred in imposing a pre-

sumption of negligence.

As no evidence of specific acts of negligence

or causation was presented, the trial court's decision should be reversed.
4.

Assuming the trial court incorrectly imposed a presumption of

negligence, the record is devoid of any evidence of any specific acts of
negligence, ordinary or gross, on the part of Vaughn.
8

Thus, absent a

presumption of negligence, the decision of the trial court must be
reversed.
5.

Vaughn successfully rebutted the presumption of negligence.

Once a presumption of negligence arises, the burden of going forward
with the evidence, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the
bailee.

The only evidence which was presented concerning Vaughn's

care of the bailed goods is that he exercised the same care with
respect to the bailed goods as he did with respect to his own property.
That is, the condominium unit was secured with deadbolt locks.

In

addition, Jeffrey testified that he specifically recalled securing the unit
on the day of the theft.

As McPherson relied solely on the presump-

tion of negligence and that presumption was rebutted, the trial court
erred in awarding Judgment to McPherson.
ARGUMENT
I.
VAUGHN DID NOT ENTER INTO A CONTRACT
OF BAILMENT WITH MCPHERSON
A.
Elements of Bailment
The trial court found that Vaughn and McPherson entered into a
contract of bailment, that they therefore stood in the relationship of
bailee and bailor and that McPherson's personal property was delivered
to Vaughn, rather than Jeffrey.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, (R. 203, 11 7; 204, 11 1) (see Addendum).
As stated at 8 Am. Jur. 2d BAILMENTS § 2,
9

A "bailment" in its ordinary legal signification,
imports the delivery of personal property by
one person to another in trust for a specific
purpose, with a contract, express or implied,
that the trust shall be faithfully executed and
the property returned or duly accounted for
when the special purpose is accomplished or
kept until the bailor reclaims it. (id. at 738)
Inherent in this definition is the requirement that the bailee have
actual possession and control of the subject of the bailment. In Marsh
vs. American Locker Co., 1 N.J. Super. 81, 72 A.2d 343 (1950), the
Court stated this proposition as follows:
Although conflicting views have been expressed by the authorities as to whether
common law bailments necessarily arise out of
contract, they all recognize the need that
there be possession of the property by the
bailee. See 4 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.
1936) pp. 2888, 2890; Brown, Personal Property
(1936) pp. 225, 230. (72 A.2d at 344)
Similarly, in 1440 Park Road Parking, Inc. vs. Consolidated Mutual
Insurance Company, 168 A.2d 900 (D.C. Mun. App. 1961), the Court
noted that:

M

[t]he creation of a bailment requires that possession and

control over an object pass from the bailor to the bailee".

(168 A.2d

at 901) (emphasis added).
The Court, in Broaddus vs. Commercial National Bank, 113 Okla.
10, 237 P. 538 (1925), held that to constitute a bailment there must be
a delivery and full transfer of the property to the bailee, so as to
exclude the possession of the owner and all other persons and give to
the bailee, for the time being, the sole custody and control of the
property.

(237 P. at 584).
10

More recently the Oregon Court of Appeals, in Dundas vs. Lincoln
County, 48 Or. App. 1025, 618 P.2d 978 (1980), stated that "[i]n order
for a bailment to exist, the bailee must have both possession and
physical control . . .".

(618 P.2d at 982).

Thus, in order for Vaughn and McPherson to stand in the
relationship of bailee and bailor, the evidence must establish (a) the
delivery of personal property to Vaughn; (b) a contract, express or
implied, that Vaughn would hold the personal property in trust for
McPherson; (c) actual possession and physical control of the bailed
property by Vaughn; and (d) an agreement that the bailed property
would be safely returned to McPherson.
B.
Evidence Supporting
Trial Court's Finding
The evidence which supports the finding of the trial court as to
the existence of a bailment is as follows:
1.

McPherson testified, on direct examination, as follows:
A:

. . . we had found a place but it was
furnished and now we had to do something with our furniture.
And he
[Vaughn] indicated at that time that his
- it was his son and - it would be his
son moving in and he was just getting
divorced and he had no furniture. And
so it was - you know, he said, well, he
[Jeffrey] wouldn't mind if that was left
there, he would take good care of it. .
. . But it was Vaughn who was the
person I was dealing with because it was
Vaughn who had bought our house.

11

Mr. Reed:
Objection, your Honor.
answer at this point is not responsive.
The Court:

The

The objection is sustained.

(Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins. 10-25).
2.

McPherson

also testified

that his understanding

agreement concerning the furniture was that " . . .

of the

the furniture was

just to be left there long enough until we could find a permanent place
to live".
3.

(Trial Transcript, p. 11, Ins. 15-17).
As to the basis for McPherson's belief that his agreement was

with Vaughn, as opposed to Jeffrey, McPherson testified as follows:
A:

Well, being the basis - the basis of the
understanding was that the furniture was
just to be left long enough until we
could find a place to live and it was
done with - my whole dealings were
with Vaughn. It was Vaughn who had
purchased our home. It was Vaughn
with which I had developed a comfort
zone with, and that was basically it. I
was going off assurances that his son
was responsible and would take care of
the property.

(Trial Transcript, p. 11, Ins. 21-25; p. 12, Ins.
1-4).
4. In response to questioning by the Court about statements made
by the parties concerning the alleged agreement, McPherson stated:
The Witness: When we were talking we said
now we're going to have to find a place for
the furniture. At that time he [Vaughn] said
that his son had no furniture, he was just
going through a divorce and, you know, if we
wanted to leave the furniture there that
would be fine until we could find a permanent place for it, because - this thing was
12

very inconvenient thing for everyone involved.
The Court:

What did you say?

The Witness: I said that was fine. The
only thing we were concerned about was, you
know, whether or not Jeff would take care of
the - you know, be responsible for the furniture, I mean take care of it.
(Trial Transcript, p. 14, Ins. 7-20).
5. As to possession and control of the bailed property, McPherson
testified, on cross examination, as follows:
Q:

(By Mr. Reed) . . . Just so I'm straight
on this, did Jeff Belnap move into the
condominium unit right after you moved
out?

A:

I believe so.

Q:

And the furniture was left in the condominium for Jeff to use?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did you have access to the furniture if
you wanted it?

A:

Only by contacting someone ahead of
time and letting them know that we
would be making arrangements.

Q:

You would just call Jeff and say, hey I
want to come by and get my television?

A:

Jeff or Vaughn.

(Trial Transcript, p. 35, Ins. 12-25; p. 36, Ins.
1-4)
6.

Vaughn's testimony concerning arrangements to leave the

furniture in the apartment rented and occupied by Jeffrey is as follows:
13

Q:

(By Mr. Reed) What did you say? Or,
well, perhaps what did Mr. McPherson
say would be more appropriate?

A:

Mr. McPherson told me that they had
found a furnished apartment at American Towers, that they were in the
process of making an offer or a deal on
another home, that it would be very
inconvenient for them to have to move
all the furniture to a storage unit and
then take it to the house, did I think it
was possible or did Jeff agree to them
leaving some of their belongings in the
condominium.

Q:

What did you say to that request?

A:

I responded, Jeff would probably be
delighted since he was going through a
divorce and his wife had taken everything he had and he would probably
come with his toothbrush and personal
belongings, but that I would call Jeff
and explain the situation to him.

Q:

Did you call Jeff concerning this proposal?

A:

Yes I did.

Q:

(By Mr. Reed) Did Jeff agree to keep
the furniture?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did you have any other conversations
with Mr. McPherson concerning storage
of the furniture?

A:

No, not other than calling him and
telling him Jeff had agreed to let him
leave some of the items there.

14

(Trial Transcript, p. 62, Ins. 6-24; p. 63, Ins.
5-11).
7.

No evidence was presented which even suggests that Jeffrey

was an agent, or acted under the direction or control, of Vaughn.

In

fact, the only evidence presented concerning their relationship, other
than familial, concerned the lease of the condominium unit by Jeffrey.
Q:

(By Mr. Reed) Did Jeff move into this
condominium unit?

A:

(By Vaughn) Yes he did.

Q:

Did he pay rent for the unit?

A:

Yes he did.

Q:

Did he pay rent to you?

A:

Yes.

Q:

What was the amount of rent?

A:

I believe it was $750.00 a month.

Q:

Was that the same amount as was paid
by Mr. McPherson?

A:

Yes.

Q:

I take it then Jeffrey was a tenant?

A:

He was at the time.

(Trial Transcript, p. 64, Ins. 5-17).
8.

As to actual physical possession and control of the bailed

property, the only evidence offered is as follows:
A:

(By McPherson) . . . It was his son and
- it would be his son moving and he
[Jeffrey] was just getting divorced and he
[Jeffrey] had no furniture. And so it
15

was - you know, he [Vaughn] said well
he [Jeffrey] wouldn't mind if it was left
there, he [Jeffrey] would take good care
of it.
(Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins. 12-16).
A:

(By McPherson) I was going off assurances that his son [Jeffrey] was responsible and would take care of the property.

(Trial Transcript, p. 12, Ins. 2-4).
A:

(By McPherson) The only thing we were
concerned about was, you know, whether
or not Jeff would take care of the - you
know, be responsible for the furniture, I
mean take care of it.

(Trial Transcript, p. 14, Ins. 17-20).
Q:

(By Mr. Reed) Did you ever have any
of Mr. McPherson's furniture in your
possession?

A:

(By Vaughn)

Q:

Did you ever have the use of that
furniture?

A:

No I did not.

No I not. [sic]

(Trial Transcript, p. 64, Ins. 18-23).
Q:

(By Mr. Reed)
Have you ever had
possession of that furniture?

A:

(By Vaughn)

Q:

Ever use the furniture?

A:

No sir.

No, I never have.

(Trial Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 13-17).
16

c.
Application of Law to Evidence
As set forth above, other than McPherson's statements that he
relied on Vaughn because Vaughn had purchased his home and he had
developed a "comfort zone" with Vaughn, there is no evidence that
Vaughn agreed to hold the furniture for the benefit of McPherson or
that Vaughn agreed to return the furniture.
The only testimony with respect to the care, or return, of the
furniture is that Vaughn informed McPherson that he believed that
Jeffrey would care for the furniture.
Similarly, there is no evidence which even suggests that Vaughn
ever accepted delivery or had possession or control of the bailed
personal property.

The only evidence is that the bailed property was

in the sole possession and control of Jeffrey.

In fact, one of the two

reasons that the furniture was left in Jeffrey's condominium unit was to
allow him to have the use of the furniture.
Although Vaughn facilitated the storage of the furniture by Jeffrey,
and acted as an intermediary between McPherson and Jeffrey, he did
not agree to accept delivery of the furniture

and did not have

possession of the bailed property.
It was McPherson's clear understanding and intent that Jeffrey,
rather than Vaughn, have the use, control and possession of the bailed
property.
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Even considering the evidence offered by McPherson in support
of his claim, the trial court's finding that a bailment was created
between McPherson and Vaughn and that McPherson delivered the
personal property to Vaughn, and not Jeffrey, is so lacking in support
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making it clearly
erroneous.

Because McPherson and Vaughn did not stand in the

relationship of bailor and bailee, the decision of the trial court must be
reversed and Judgment entered accordingly.
II.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT A BAILMENT WAS
CREATED, THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
IT WAS A BAILMENT FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT
A.
Applicable Law
The law generally recognizes three types of bailments:

(1) a

bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor; (2) a bailment for the sole
benefit of the bailee; and (3) a bailment for the mutual benefit of
both the bailee and bailor.

Those bailments falling within the first

category are known as gratuitous bailments.

Those included within the

latter two categories are often referred to as "bailments for hire".
The duties of a gratuitous bailee differ, in degree, from those of
a bailee for hire.

A bailee for hire must exercise the degree of care

which an ordinary prudent person under similar circumstances would
exercise toward his own property.
167, 111 P.2d 545 (1941).

Romney vs. Covey Garage, 100 Utah

However, as noted by the Court in Loomis

vs. Imperial Motors, Inc. 88 Ida. 74, 396 P.2d 467 (1964), "[t]he liability
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of a gratuitous bailee . . . is generally recognized as one arising only
from gross negligence".

(396 P.2d at 469-70).

Although Vaughn strenuously contends that a bailment was not
created, if such a relationship existed Vaughn was a gratuitous bailee
and may be found liable only for acts of gross negligence.
The trial court found as follows:
The Court further believes that bailment was
for the mutual benefit of both parties. The
plaintiff accommodated defendant Vaughn
Belnap in furthering the sale of the condominium by moving out prior to the expiration of the lease and by allowing Vaughn
Belnap to use the furniture in furtherance of
the sale of the condominium, to his son who
had no furniture. (Findings of Fact, 11 8, R.
203).
B.
Evidence Supporting
Trial Court's Finding
1.

As discussed, in detail, above, one of the factors leading to

the storage of the McPhersons' property in Jeffrey's condominium unit
was that he had no furniture and the use of the McPhersons' furniture
would be beneficial to him.

(Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins, 10-25; p. 14,

Ins. 7-20; p. 35, Ins. 16-18; p. 62, Ins. 6-24; p. 63, Ins 5-11).
2.

The primary purpose of the storage arrangement was to

provide storage facilities to McPherson without cost and to eliminate the
necessity of moving the furniture twice. (Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins. 1025; p. 11, Ins. 21-25; p. 14, Ins. 7-20; p. 62, Ins. 6-15).
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3.

The only testimony concerning the alleged benefit to Vaughn

is as follows:
Q:

(By Mr. Reed)
Did you receive any
benefit from the storage of that furniture
in the condominium unit?

A:

(By Vaughn)

No.

Just headaches.

(Trial Transcript, p. 64, Ins. 24-25; p. 65, In.
i)
Q:

(By Mr. Kunkel) Would it have benefitted you if your son purchased the
condominium unit?

A:

(By Vaughn)

Q:

So, the McPhersons moved out as an
accommodation to you; is that correct?

A:

That is correct.

Obviously.

(Trial Transcript, p. 38, Ins. 18-23).
Q:

(By Mr. Reed) In the winter of 1988
did you have any legal obligation to
support Jeff Belnap?

A:

(By Vaughn)

No I didn't.

(Trial Transcript, p. 69, Ins. 9-11).
4.

During closing argument, McPhersons' counsel argued as

follows:
When Mr. McPherson was asked to leave the condominium unit, he wanted to accommodate Mr. Belnap. In
order to make that accommodation, Mr. McPherson had to
leave his property there.
So it was a benefit to Mr.
McPherson and Mr. Belnap testified it was a benefit to him
by having them leave so he could sell the unit.
(Trial
Transcript, p. 79, Ins. 2-8).
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c.
Application of Law to Evidence
Although the evidence clearly establishes that McPherson accommodated Vaughn by vacating the condominium unit, there is no
evidence which supports McPherson's argument that Vaughn used the
furniture to further the sale of the condominium to Jeffrey.

In fact,

the only evidence on this point is that Jeffrey agreed to purchase the
condominium prior to the time McPherson was asked to vacate the
unit.

(Trial Transcript, p. 38, Ins. 10-17; p. 61, Ins. 8-15).
Jeffrey, not Vaughn, had the exclusive use and possession of the

McPhersons' furniture.

Jeffrey offered to purchase the condominium

prior to the time the storage of furniture was ever discussed.
had no obligation to provide furniture for Jeffrey's use.

Vaughn

Vaughn did

not receive any benefit from the use of the furniture by Jeffrey or
from the storage of that furniture in the condominium unit.
Again, the trial court's finding that the "bailment was for the
mutual benefit" of McPherson and Vaughn is so lacking in support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence and is thus, clearly
erroneous.

For this reason, the trial court incorrectly applied a

standard of ordinary care, rather than gross negligence and therefore,
its decision must be reversed.
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HI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING
A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
A.
A Presumption of Negligence Arises Only if
the Bailee has Exclusive Possession of
the Bailed Property
In the context of an action to recover for damage to bailed goods,
a presumption of negligence is imposed on the bailee for hire, once the
bailment and the damage to the bailed goods are established.

Romney,

supra at 546.
However, this general rule is subject to an important exception
which is applicable to the present case.
The leading Utah case concerning the imposition of a presumption
of negligence in the context of a bailment is Staheli vs. Farmer's
Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982).

There, this

Court was confronted with a question of law identical to that present
in this action, i.e. under what circumstances will a presumption of
negligence arise.
The underlying facts in Staheli are as follows:

Plaintiff hired the

defendant, Farmer's Co-op, to store barley pursuant to an oral contract
of bailment.

The Co-op leased one-half of a potato cellar, owned by

another entity, for purposes of storing the barley.

The portion of the

cellar not used by the Co-op was used by the owner of the cellar for
its own purposes.

There was no wall or partition between the portion

of the cellar leased by the Co-op and the part retained by the owner.
22

Persons other than the bailee had access to the stored barley.
bailor had knowledge of this arrangement.

The

The barley was destroyed,

in part, by a fire of unknown origin.
The bailor brought suit against the Co-op to recover the value of
the damaged barley and, as in the present case, at trial relied on the
presumption of negligence.
The trial court entered Judgment for the Co-op finding that a
presumption of negligence did not arise and that " . . . no negligence
on the part of the defendant was shown by the plaintiff, and without
a showing of negligence on the part of the defendant, defendant is not
responsible for the fire of unknown origin which caused the loss".
Staheli, supra at 682.
On appeal, plaintiff-appellant argued that it was entitled to a
presumption that the Co-op was negligent as a matter of law and that
the Co-op did not rebut that presumption.

The Co-op argued that a

presumption of negligence did not arise and that therefore the burden
of proof did not shift because it did not have exclusive possession of
the bailed goods.
In deciding whether a presumption of negligence arises under
circumstances where the bailee does not have exclusive possession or
control of the bailed goods, this Court, in Staheli, first examined the
general rule applicable to contracts of bailment.

The Court explained

that the rationale supporting the general rule is that the party who is
in possession of another's property is in a better position to control any
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conditions which might cause damage to the property or, at the least,
he will be able to ascertain the cause of any damage.
The Court recognized that the imposition of a presumption of
negligence in the context of a bailment action is analogous to application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Of course, one of the

prerequisites to application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that
the defendant have exclusive control of the instrumentality causing the
injury.

Similarly, with respect to a bailment action, the bailee must

have exclusive possession of the bailed property.

After discussing these

factors, this Court held as follows:
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is
that the bailee be in exclusive possession [of
the bailed goods] and it is that proposition
that gives logical force to the presumption.
(655 P.2d at 680) (emphasis added).
The Staheli Court also noted that on the facts before it, the Coop did not have exclusive control of the premises in which the barley
was stored and concluded that " . . . the trial court properly held that
a presumption of negligence did not arise because of the absence of the
Coop's exclusive control of the premises".

(Staheli, supra at 684)

(emphasis added).
The proposition that a presumption of negligence arises in bailment
cases only upon a showing that the bailee had exclusive possession and
control of the bailed goods, as set forth in Staheli, supra, is not unique
to Utah.

The courts of numerous other jurisdictions have recognized

this requirement.
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In Burt vs. Blackfoot Motor Supply Company, 67 Idaho 548, 186
P.2d 498 (1947) and Nolan vs. Auto Transporters, 225 Kan. 176, 597
P.2d 614 (1979) the courts stated that a presumption of negligence
arises when the bailed goods are in the exclusive possession and control
of the bailee, (186 P.2d at 501; 597 P.2d at 621).
The rationale for this prerequisite to imposition of a presumption
of negligence was succinctly expressed by the Court in Moe vs. American
Ice and Cold Storage Company, 30 Wash.2d 51, 190 P.2d 755 (1948),
where the Court stated:
In other words, the common law, with its
characteristic horse sense, makes a virtue out
of necessity, growing out of the fact, that,
where the bailee has the exclusive and undivided possession of the goods, he must also
have the exclusive means of showing what
became of them. Where the reason of the
law ceases, the law ceases.
For reasons
which must be perfectly manifest to any
thinking person, the rule referred to does not
obtain or apply where the bailee does not
have the exclusive and undivided possession of
the property. (Quoting from Lemnos Broadsilk Works, Inc. vs. Spiegelberg, 127 Misc. 855,
217 N.Y.S. 595, 598) (190 P.2d at 761).
Thus, in order for a presumption of negligence to arise in the
context of the present action, the evidence must establish that Vaughn
had exclusive possession of McPherson's furniture and that he had
exclusive control of the storage facility, i.e. the condominium unit rented
and occupied by Jeffrey.
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The trial court found " . . . the presumption is that the defendant
Vaughn Belnap, was negligent for failing to return the furniture . . . ".
(Findings of Fact, 11 9; Conclusions of Law, 11 3; R. 204-205).
B.
Evidence Supporting Trial
Court's Finding
1.

As discussed in detail at pages 11 through 16, above, the

bailed property, at all times, was in the actual possession of Jeffrey,
rather than Vaughn.

(Trial Transcript, p. 35, Ins. 12-18; p. 63, Ins. 5-

6).
2.

Vaughn did not have exclusive control of the premises in

which the furniture was stored.

Those premises, i.e. the condominium

unit, were controlled by Jeffrey as a tenant.

(Trial Transcript, p. 35,

Ins. 12-15; p. 64, Ins. 5-17).
3.

In addition to Jeffrey, on occasion his girlfriend was present

in the condominium unit and had access to the bailed furniture.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 49, In. 25; p. 50, Ins. 1-2; p. 51, Ins. 16-19).
C.
Application of Law to Evidence
In the present case, as in Staheli, the trial court found that
McPherson and Vaughn entered into an oral contract of bailment.

The

bailed furniture was not stored in premises controlled by Vaughn.
Rather, McPherson's property was stored, with McPherson's consent and
knowledge, in the condominium unit rented and occupied by Jeffrey.
Therefore, Jeffrey had possession of the bailed goods and control of the
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premises in which those goods were stored.

In addition, his guests had

lawful access to the premises and to the bailed furniture.
Simply stated, Vaughn had neither exclusive possession of the
McPhersons' furniture, nor exclusive control of the premises in which
the goods were stored.

Under these circumstances, a presumption of

negligence does not arise.
The

trial court's

finding

that

"the presumption

is that

the

defendant, Vaughn Belnap, was negligent" and its Conclusion of Law
that " . . .

the presumption is that Vaughn Belnap was negligent for

failing to return the furniture" are so lacking in evidentiary support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence and are thus clearly
erroneous.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 204-205).

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
VAUGHN WAS NEGLIGENT
For purposes of this argument, Vaughn will assume that the trial
court incorrectly imposed a presumption of negligence. In that case, the
bailor must establish specific acts of negligence, by a preponderance of
the evidence, and establish that those specific acts proximately caused
the alleged damages.

1.

(Staheli, supra at 684).
A,
Evidence Supporting
Finding of Negligence

The record is devoid of any evidence of any specific acts of

negligence on the part of Vaughn.

Although in closing argument,

McPherson's counsel questioned whether " . . . the alleged theft was an
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inside job or done by a third party", there is no evidence to support
this speculation.

(Trial Transcript, p. 80, Ins. 5-6).

The only evidence

which pertains to this point is a stipulation to the effect that the police
investigation revealed no signs of forcible entry.

(Trial Transcript, p.

47, Ins. 1-3).
2.

A witness to the theft, Afton Todd, testified that on the day

of the theft, she saw a pickup truck parked at the condominium unit,
a man get out of the pickup, walk up to the unit and return to the
pickup and then later the pickup truck returned and was loaded with
furniture.

(Trial Transcript, p. 55, Ins. 11-19).

She also testified that

neither Vaughn nor Jeffrey were occupants of the pickup truck.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 55, Ins. 24-25; p. 56, Ins. 1-4).
3.

Jeffrey testified that he specifically recalled that the con-

dominium unit was secured on the day of the theft.

He remembered

locking the doors on that day because they were locked in response to
an incident involving his ex-wife and his girlfriend.

(Trial Transcript,

p. 49, Ins. 18-25; p. 50, Ins. 1-13; p. 51, Ins. 3-25; p. 52, Ins. 1-10).
B.
Application of Law to Evidence
Simply stated, no evidence of any negligent conduct on the part
of Vaughn was introduced at trial. Therefore, absent a presumption of
negligence, the trial court's finding that Vaughn was negligent and that
his negligence proximately caused McPherson's injuries is so lacking in
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support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence and is clearly
erroneous.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT VAUGHN DID NOT REBUT THE
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
A.
Applicable Law
For the purposes of this argument, Vaughn will assume that the
trial court correctly imposed a presumption of negligence and found that
a bailment for mutual benefit was created.
Under

these circumstances, Vaughn was bound

to care

for

McPherson's property with the same degree of care which an ordinary
prudent person under similar circumstances would exercise toward his
own property.

(Romney, supra, at 546).

Of course, once a presumption of negligence arises, the burden of
going forward with the evidence to rebut that presumption rests on the
bailee.

(Staheli, supra, at 682).

remains with the bailor.

However, the burden of persuasion

(Staheli, supra, at 683, fn. 1).

The trial court found that " . . . Vaughn Belnap failed to prove
that the loss of the furniture was not the result of his negligence".
(Findings of Fact, 11 9; Conclusion of Law, 11 3; R. 204-205).

1.

B.
Evidence Supporting
Trial Court's Findings
The only evidence presented concerning the exercise of care

by Vaughn is as follows:
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Q:

(By Mr. Reed)
You lived in that
condominium unit prior to September,
1988; is that correct?

A:

(By Vaughn)

Q:

Did you have locks on the doors?

A:

Yes.

Q:

I assume there were windows in place?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Normal security?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Was there any difference in the security
of the unit at the time you lived in it
than when Jeff lived there?

A:

No.

That's correct.

Normal locks and deadbolt doors.

(Trial Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 21-25; p. 69, Ins.
1-8).
2. In addition, Jeffrey testified that he specifically recalled locking
and securing the condominium unit on the day of the theft.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 49, Ins. 13-25; p. 50, Ins. 1-13; p. 51, Ins. 20-25; p. 52,
Ins. 1-10).
C.
Application of Law to Evidence
Although only limited evidence was presented concerning Vaughn's
care of McPherson's property, that evidence rebuts the presumption of
negligence.
Vaughn stated that he used the same degree of care, i.e. locks
and other normal security, as he had employed in the care of his own
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possessions.

Jeffrey testified that he specifically recalled securing the

condominium unit on the day of the theft.

No evidence was presented

which contradicts this testimony.
Therefore,

Vaughn

successfully

rebutted

the

presumption

of

negligence and the trial court's Finding, to the effect that "Vaughn
Belnap, failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not the result
of his negligence", and its identical Conclusion of Law, are so lacking
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.

(Finding

of Facts, 11 10 and Conclusion of Law, 11 3, R. 204-205).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's award of Judgment to McPherson may, and should
be, reversed for five different reasons.
First, the court erred in finding that McPherson and Belnap stood
in the relationship of bailor and bailee.

The undisputed evidence

establishes that McPherson did not enter into a bailment agreement with
Vaughn, rather he entered into such an agreement with Jeffrey and
Vaughn simply acted as an intermediary between the two.

Similarly,

the undisputed evidence establishes that Jeffrey, rather than Vaughn,
accepted possession of the bailed goods.
Second, the bailment, if any, to which Vaughn was a party was a
gratuitous bailment, rather than a bailment for mutual benefit.

Thus,

Vaughn may only be held liable for acts of gross negligence, as
opposed to a breach of the standard of ordinary care.
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Thus, the trial

court applied an incorrect standard of care and its decision should be
reversed.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the trial court erred in
imposing a presumption of negligence.

In Staheli, supra, this court

unequivocally held that a presumption of negligence arises in the context
of a bailment only where the bailee has exclusive possession of the
bailed property and exclusive control of the premises in which that
property is stored.

The record is devoid of any evidence which would

even suggest that Vaughn had exclusive possession of McPherson's
furniture or exclusive control of the condominium unit. For this reason,
a presumption of negligence does not arise.
Fourth, as McPherson failed to present any evidence of specific
acts of negligence on Vaughn's part and relied solely on the presumption, the trial court's decision must be reversed.
Fifth, even should this Court find that a presumption of negligence
was correctly imposed, Vaughn successfully rebutted that presumption.
The only evidence concerning the care which he exercised for the bailed
goods is that he used the same ordinary care which he exercised for
his own property.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Appellant Vaughn Belnap
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Judgment of the Third
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County and instruct it to enter
Judgment in favor of Defendant.
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 18th day of June, 1991.
CROWTHER & REED
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Memorandum Decision, Dated September 14, 1990

Memorandum Decision [re: Motion for New Trial], Dated January 2,
1991

Order [Denying Motion for New Trial and Objections to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law], dated January 24, 1991

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated January 24, 1991
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON,

CIVIL NO.

890902949 PD

Plaintiffs,
vs.
VAUGHN BELNAP and
JEFFREY BELNAP,
Defendants.

This case was tried on August
Court, without a jury.
and

represented

by

<2

1990 before the

Plaintiff Joseph McPherson was present

Scott

McPherson was not present.

S. Kunkel.

Plaintiff Joan Elissa

The defendants, Vaughn Belnap and

Jeffrey Belnap were present and represented by Larry G. Reed.
The

Court

heard

testimony

of

the

witnesses,

admitted

documentary evidence, heard oral argument and took the matter
under advisement.

The Court now being fully advised, enters

its ruling.
This case arose as a result of the defendant Vaughn Belnap
leasing

to the plaintiffs

a condominium

months.

During the term of the lease defendant, Vaughn Belnap,

had an opportunity to sell the condominium.

for a term

of six

He requested that

MCPHERSON V. BELNAP

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE TWO

the plaintiffs vacate the premises to accommodate the sale,
which they did.

However, the parties agreed that plaintiffs

could leave their furniture in the premises until such time as
they

located

furniture.

a

residence

which

could

accommodate

the

Defendant Vaughn Belnap stated that the furniture

would be a benefit to him because his son, who was in the midst
of a divorce proceeding, could use the furniture.
Defendant Vaughn Belnap could not return the furniture upon
plaintiffs7 request, because he claimed it was stolen.
The Court has concluded that under this fact situation a
bailment

has

been

created.

The

plaintiffs

delivered

to

defendant Vaughn Belnap and not Jeffrey Belnap the furniture,
with

the

express understanding

that

the

furniture would

be

returned to plaintiffs.
The bailment was for the mutual benefit of both parties.
The

plaintiffs

accommodated

defendant

Vaughn

Belnap

in

furthering the sale, plus allowing defendant Vaughn Belnap to
use the furniture in furtherance of the sale of the condominium
to his son who had no furniture.
The Court

further concludes that since this was a case

where there was a mutual benefit, the presumption is that the
defendant, Vaughn Belnap, was negligent for failing to return

f^fi>-:;
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the furniture as agreed.

Defendant Vaughn Belnap failed to

prove that the loss of the furniture was not as a result of his
negligence.
As a result of defendant Vaughn Belnap being unable to
return the furniture to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs suffered
damages in the sum of $6,000.00, together with their costs and
interest.
The Court refers the parties to plaintiff's Trial Brief for
additional reasons in support of its decision.
Plaintiffs7
Conclusions

of

counsel
Law,

shall

and

prepare

Judgment

in

Findings

of

accordance

Fact
with

Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

day of September, 1990.

ipHjt A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

and
this
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the
this

fl

foregoing

Memorandum

Decision,

to the

day of September, 1990:

Scott S. Kunkel
Robert W, Thompson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Larry G. Reed
Attorney for Defendant
455 South 300 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON,

CIVIL NO.

890902949 PD

Plaintiffs,
vs.
VAUGHN BELNAP and
JEFFREY BELNAP,
Defendants.

Defendant Vaughn Belnap7s Motion for New Trial or Direct
Entry of Judgment in Favor of Defendant, Motion to Tax Bill of
Costs, Objection to form of Judgment and proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were heard on the 2 6th
November,
Kunkel.
The
parties,

1990.

Plaintiffs

were

represented

by

day of

Scott

S.

Defendant was represented by Larry G. Reed.
Court
heard

advisement.

read

the

oral

Memoranda

argument,

and

filed
took

by
the

the

respective

matter

under

The Court now rules.

The first issue the Court will address is whether or not
defendant Vaughn Belnap was negligent in failing to return the
plaintiffs7 furniture since there was a bailment for the mutual
benefit of the parties.

^

i^
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Vaughn Belnap contends that the Court erred in concluding
that the theft of the plaintiffs' furniture was caused by the
negligence of Vaughn Belnap.
Vaughn

Belnap

relies

upon

Staheli

v.

Farmers

Co-op

of

Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982), as the basis for the
Court erring in its decision.
The Court has reviewed the Staheli case and believes the
Staheli case is distinguishable from the present case.
In

this

case

the

plaintiffs

placed

the

furniture

with

Vaughn Belnap exclusively, and he in turn allowed his son to
occupy the premises where the furniture was to be stored.
Plaintiffs7 only access to the furniture was by permission
of Vaughn Belnap.
Vaughn Belnap was the only party who could authorize the
moving of the furniture from the premises.
Vaughn Belnap's son, Jeffrey Belnap, had no authority to do
anything

with

the

furniture

other

than

as

an

agent

or

representative of his father.
Vaughn Belnap entrusted Jeffrey Belnap to protect, secure
and care for the furniture so that it could be returned to
plaintiffs.

(^ -
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The findings in the Staheli case were:
All of the parties were aware of the easy
access to all parts of the potato pit at all
times crucial herein and most, if not all, along
with third party owner of the potato pit and
others were in and out of the premises as they
desired or as their business dictated.
Doors
were left open and little or no concern was
expressed by anyone concerning the other stored
equipment or materials, which plaintiffs would
now
have
this
court
find
constituted
an
unreasonable risk of the loss that actually
occurred or that the defendant had responsibility
under the law to control transients at or near
the
premises,
which
plaintiffs
further
hypothesized may have caused the fire.
The facts in this case and the Staheli case in this Court's
opinion are not similar; therefore, the Court cannot come to
the same conclusion as Vaughn Belnap has reached.
The Staheli case held that "one who is in possession of
another's property

is

in a better position

to

control

the

conditions that may cause the loss and to know, or at least to
be able to ascertain the cause of any actual loss or damage."
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is that the bailee
be in exclusive possession, and it is that proposition that
gives logical force to the presumption.
In this case, as the Court pointed out to counsel at the
time of oral argument, the bailee should not be able to escape
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liability by turning over the care and security of the property
to an employee,
elected

representative, or an agent•

to name his

son as caretaker

Vaughn

of the

Belnap

furniture and

therefore must assume the responsibility for its safety.
The

Staheli

presumption

case

allocates

aptly
the

states

burden

the

of proof

rule:

"Thus,

the

to

party

most

a

likely to have access to the evidence and, in the absence of
evidence places liability on the party most likely to have been
able to avert the loss."
In this case Vaughn Belnap contends that the furniture was
stolen

from

the

forcible entry.

condominium,

but

there

was

no

evidence

of

The only evidence presented was self-serving

statements of Jeffrey Belnap that the doors and windows were
locked when he left the premises.
The Court denies Vaughn Belnap's Motion for a New Trial or
Entry of Judgment in his favor.
Vaughn Belnap's Motion to Tax Costs is granted.
Vaughn Belnap7s objection to the granting of prejudgment
interest is denied.
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Plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare an Order in accordance
with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this JC

day of January, 1991.

?

JLA

[JOHN A. ROKICH
RICT COURT JUDGE

(
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH EDWARD MCPHERSON and
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON,
Plaintiffs,

]
]
]

ORDER

vs.

]

VAUGHAN BELNAP and JEFFREY
BELNAP,

]i Civil No. 890902949 PD
]
) Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.
Defendant Vaughan

Belnap's Motion

for New Trial or

Entry of Judgment in favor of Defendnat, Motion to Tax Costs and
Objection to Form of Judgment came on regularly

for hearing

before the Honorable John A. Rokich of the above-entitled Court
on November

26, 1990, Larry G. Reed appearing on behalf of

Defendant Vaughan Belnap and Scott S. Kunkel appearing on behalf
of Plaintiffs, Joseph Edward McPherson and Joan Elissa McPherson.
Based upon the oral argument of counsel, study of the various
motions and memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, and
good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Motion for a New Trial

or Entry of Judgment in his favor is denied.
(

.:

')

2.

Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Motion to Tax Costs is

3.

Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Objection to Granting

granted.

of Pre-judgment interest is denied.

/. ^

*— /J

A

v? '„

DATED this JL</_ day of January, 1991.^"^- £fw^*-o~, i *^~
BY THE COURT:

3?h£j Honorable John A. Rokich
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Larry G. Reed
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I hereby certify that on the |*~>^day of January, 1991,
I deposited in the U.S. Mail, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Mr. Larry Reed
Crowther & Reed
455 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
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Telephone (801) 484-3000
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON,
Plaintiffs,

;
;
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

\

vs.
VAUGHAN BELNAP and
JEFFREY BELNAP,

])

Defendants.

)

Civil No. 890902949 PD
Judge John A. Rokich

This case, came on regularly for a non-jury trial on August
30, 1990, before The Honorable John A. Rokich, District Court
Judge.

Plaintiffs

Joseph

Edward

McPherson

and

Joan

Elissa

McPherson, were represented by Scott S. Kunkel of Hatch, Morton &
Skeen and Defendant Vaughan Belnap was represented by Larry G.
Reed of Crowther & Reed.

The Court having heard testimony of

witnesses, reviewed documentary evidence and argument of counsel
and being

fully advised in the premises, and for good cause

appearing, now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In or about September, 1988, Plaintiffs entered into a

lease agreement with Defendant Vaughan Belnap wherein Vaughan

r'

Belnap agreed to lease a condominium he owned, located at 9 02
West Newhampton Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, (hereinafter the
"Condominium") to Plaintiffs for a period of six (6) months,
2.

In or about December of 1988, during the term of the

lease, Vaughan Belnap had an opportunity to sell the Condominium.
Vaughan Belnap asked Plaintiffs if they would be able to vacate
the Condominium as soon as possible as he had found a buyer for
the property.

Plaintiffs agreed to vacate the Condominium to

accommodate the sale, as long as Vaughan Belnap would let them
leave their furniture in the Condominium until such time as they
could locate a residence which would accommodate their furniture.
Vaughan Belnap agreed

to this condition and

stated

that the

furniture would be of benefit to him because his son, Jeffrey
Belnap, who was in the midst of a divorce proceeding, could use
the furniture.
3.

Several

Plaintiff,
indicated

weeks

Edward
to

after moving

McPherson,

Vaughan

Belnap

out

contacted

that

he

of

the

Vaughan

needed

Condominium
Belnap

to pick up his

furniture and other personal items from the Condominium.
days

thereafter,

Vaughan

Belnap

contacted

and

Several

Plaintiffs

and

indicated that he could not return the furniture as the furniture
had been stolen.
4.
Murray
alleged

On or about December 15, 1988, Officer Marchant of the
Police
theft

Department,
of

conducted

Plaintiff's

an

property.

investigation
Officer

of

the

Marchantfs

investigation revealed that there was no evidence of any forcible
2

entry into the Condominium.
5.

At all relevant times during the events giving rise to

this action, Vaughan Belnap was the owner of the Condominium, and
Plaintiff's personal property that was left at the Condominium
and in the care, custody and control of Vaughan Belnap.
6.

The items of personal property that Vaughan Belnap did

not return to Plaintiffs are as follows:
Purchase
Price

Item
Mitsubishi 35" television
Cannondale Mud Bike
Fat Chance Bike
G.E. Microwave
Couch, Loveseat, two chairs
and one ottoman made of
elephant hide

$ 2,900.00
$
600.00
$ 1,485.00
$
3 00.00

Persian Rug

$

7.

Date
Purchased
1985
5/87
5/87

$ 6,000.00
700.00

The Court believes that under the fact situation of the

case, a bailment was created.

Plaintiffs delivered to Defendant

Vaughan Belnap, and not Jeffrey Belnap, the furniture with the
express understanding that the furniture would be returned to
Plaintiffs.
8.

The Court further believes that bailment was for the

mutual benefit
Defendant

of both parties.

Vaughen

Belnap

in

The Plaintiff
furthering

the

accommodated
sale

of

the

Condominium by moving out prior to the expiration of the lease
and

by

allowing

Vaughan

Belnap

to

use

the

furniture

in

furtherance of the sale of the Condominium, to his son who had no
furniture.
9.

Finally, the Court concludes that since this was a case
3

where there was a bailment for mutual benefit, the presumption is
that the Defendant, Vaughan Belnap, was negligent for failing to
return the furniture, as agreed•

Defendant, Vaughan Belnap,

failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not the result
of his negligence•
10.
Vaughan

The Court believes that as a result of Defendant
Belnap

Plaintiffs,

the

being

unable

Plaintiffs

to

return

suffered

the

damages

furniture

in

the

sum

to
of

$6,000.00, together with their costs and interest.
The Court, having made its Findings of Fact, now makes the
following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Under the fact situation of the case, a contract for

bailment was created between Vaughan Belnap and Plaintiffs.

The

Plaintiffs delivered to Defendant Vaughan Belnap, and not Jeffrey
Belnap, the furniture, with the express understanding that the
furniture would be returned to Plaintiff.
2.
benefit

The
of

bailment
both

that

Plaintiffs

was
and

created

was

Defendant,

for

the mutual

Vaughan

Belnap.

Plaintiffs accommodated Defendant Vaughan Belnap to further the
sale, plus allowing Defendant Vaughan Belnap to use the furniture
in furtherance of a sale of the Condominium to his son who had no
furniture.
3.

Since the bailment was for the mutual benefit of the

parties, the presumption is that Vaughan Belnap was negligent for
4

C

failing to return the furniture, as agreed.

Defendant Vaughan

Belnap failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not the
result of his negligence.
4.

As a result of the Defendant Vaughan Belnap breach of

the bailment agreement by failing to return the furniture to
Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs

suffered

damages

in

the

amount

of

$6,000.00, together with their costs and interest.
5.

Interest on $6,000.00 in damages suffered by Plaintiffs

shall accrue at the rate of 10% per annum prior to judment and
12% after judgment and will begin to run from December 15, 1988
until the time the judgment is paid in full.
6.

Additional reasons in support of the Court's decision

is contained within the Plaintiff's trial brief.
DATED this

Jf ^ day of

, 199J0.

J~~«PJUCgn^
BY THE~~C0URT:
1

I7 /

/-/

TMEjHONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge
APPROVE AS TO FORM:

LARRY REED
Attorney for Defendant Vaughn Belnap
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On the 1/ day of October, 1990, I certify that I personally
deposited into the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the
foregoing Memoranduin of Costs and Disbursement addressed to:
Larry Reed
Crowther & Reed
455 South Third East Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

